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The Cognitive-Discursive Representation of Crime and Betrayal in Julian Symons's *The Colour of Murder* and Tohir Malik's *Shaytanat*

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the cognitive-discursive representation of crime and betrayal in Julian Symons's The Colour of Murder *and Tohir Malik's* Shaytanat. *Drawing on textual and contextual analysis, it explores how these concepts are expressed both through direct lexical naming and through narrative perspective, characters' beliefs, categorization, and moral evaluation. The analysis of selected passages shows that crime is constructed through the reconstruction of events, the assessment of evidence, judgments of guilt, and differing views of offenders. Betrayal is represented through breaches of trust, loyalty, and duty. In the passages examined, Symons's protagonist tends to qualify and reframe his conduct, whereas Malik's characters more explicitly identify betrayal and assess personal or professional responsibility. The findings suggest that perspective, categorization, and evaluative reframing play a central role in shaping both concepts in English and Uzbek literary discourse.*

Keywords: Cognitive-discursive analysis, crime, betrayal, literary discourse, narrative perspective, categorization, evaluative reframing, Julian Symons, Tohir Malik

INTRODUCTION

From the second half of the twentieth century onwards, linguistics underwent a methodological shift: language came to be studied in relation to human cognition, communicative

purposes, social experience, and cultural context, alongside its internal structural organization. This shift increased interest in how linguistic units function in particular communicative situations, what knowledge structures they activate, and how they express a speaker's attitude towards reality. These developments laid the theoretical and methodological foundations for the cognitive-discursive approach, which examines texts and discourse in relation to human cognitive activity.

LITERATURE REVIEW

T. A. van Dijk's sociocognitive approach has played a significant role in the development of cognitive-discursive research. To explain the relationship between discourse, context, and cognition, van Dijk draws on the concepts of "mental models" and "context models." He argues that context is not merely a set of objective, external features of a communicative situation. Rather, it is a subjective mental construct formed by discourse participants on the basis of the aspects of that situation they consider relevant [8: 159]. These context models are organized in episodic memory and influence which information is treated as relevant, which linguistic forms are selected, and how the situation is interpreted during the production and comprehension of discourse.

Within this framework, external reality is not reproduced mechanically in discourse. It is perceived by an individual, related to existing knowledge and experience, evaluated from a particular perspective, and only then expressed through linguistic means. The same event may therefore be conceptualized differently by different discourse participants. This is particularly evident in literary discourse, where the author, narrator, and characters may hold different attitudes towards an event. Discursive meaning thus extends beyond the lexical meanings of individual words: it is also shaped by what characters know or assume, their emotional and evaluative responses, and the perspectives from which they perceive events.

In van Dijk's sociocognitive approach, mental models serve as cognitive mediators between discourse and social situations.

He presents context models as a mechanism for explaining how discourse becomes appropriate to a particular communicative situation. They also provide a theoretical basis for understanding discourse style and communicative choices. Accordingly, cognitive-discursive analysis asks not only "what is expressed in a text," but also "who conceptualizes an event, on the basis of what knowledge, from which perspective, and with what evaluation."

A further contribution to the methodology of cognitive-discursive research is Thora Tenbrink's *Cognitive Discourse Analysis* (CODA) [7: 98]. Tenbrink proposes this approach as a means of investigating mental representations and higher-level cognitive processes through linguistic data. From this perspective, language is treated not merely as a product of communication but also as empirical evidence that can offer insight into the processes underlying it, including conceptualization, the organization of space and time, and problem solving.

Cognitive-discursive analysis offers valuable methodological possibilities for the study of literary discourse. In a literary work, events are not simply recorded by the author or a character; they are reconstructed through a particular narrative perspective, conceptual model, and set of linguistic choices. Cognitive stylistics therefore provides a framework for studying literary texts at the intersection of linguistics, literary studies, and cognitive science. The volume *Cognitive Stylistics: Language and Cognition in Text Analysis*, edited by E. Semino & J. Culpeper, examines phenomena such as characterization, figurative language, *mind style*, and the conceptualization of space from a cognitive perspective [5: 34].

In particular, E. Semino examines *mind style* in literary narrative from a cognitive-stylistic perspective, showing how linguistic choices contribute to the construction of a character's or narrator's distinctive conceptual worldview [5: 76]. J. Culpeper, meanwhile, analyzes characterization within cognitive stylistics, focusing on the relationship between linguistic cues in the text and the reader's mental representation of a character [1: 251].

These theoretical perspectives are relevant to the study of how the concepts of crime and betrayal are manifested in literary discourse. In a text, these concepts may be activated not only by direct lexical designations such as "crime," "murder," "betrayal," "treachery," *jinoyat*, *qotillik*, *xiyonat*, and *sotqinlik*, but also through participants' actions, motives, goals, and evaluations; their emotional states; spatial and temporal relations; metaphorical expressions; and contextual implications. The same act may be categorized and evaluated differently by a perpetrator, a victim, an investigator, or another character. Identifying how a concept is manifested in discourse therefore requires attention to frames, mental models, narrative perspective, epistemic stance, and evaluative judgment alongside explicit lexical naming.

METHODOLOGY

Drawing on the theoretical and methodological principles outlined above, this study examines how the concepts of "crime" and "betrayal" are manifested in the works of T. Malik & J. Symons at the textual and contextual levels. The textual analysis identifies the lexical-semantic, phraseological, grammatical, modal, and stylistic devices that activate these concepts directly or indirectly and examines their role in constructing conceptual meaning. The contextual analysis considers event models, temporal and spatial relations, discourse participants and their communicative roles, mental models and frames, narrative perspective, communicative purpose, and evaluative attitudes. By integrating the findings from these two levels of analysis, the study establishes how "crime" and "betrayal" are conceptualized, presented from particular perspectives, and evaluated in English and Uzbek literary discourse.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The cognitive-discursive manifestation of the concept of "crime' in J. Symons's *The Colour of Murder* can be examined through the following microcontext:

> I'm trying to trace his movements on the night of the murder. I believe he was in the Diving Bell. [6: 92]

In this passage, the concept of "crime" is explicitly activated by the word "murder." Its meaning within the discourse, however, extends beyond this direct designation through the interaction of other linguistic and contextual elements.

At the textual level, the concept of "crime" is conveyed through more than the word "murder." The expressions "trace his movements," "on the night of the murder," and "in the Diving Bell," together with "I believe," construct a reconstruction of events as part of a murder investigation. The phrases "I'm trying" and "I believe" are particularly significant: the former presents the attempt to establish what happened as ongoing, while the latter marks the speaker's account as a belief rather than established fact.

The semantic progression within the passage can therefore be provisionally modelled as follows: "murder," "tracing," "movements," "time" and "location" and "belief."

Consider another passage from the novel:

> Not lies exactly, but equally it was not the truth, unimportant incidents appeared extraordinarily magnified, and those that would have provided the key to a situation seemed to be ignored. [6: 217]

This passage presents John Wilkins's perception of the testimony given during the trial. He does not regard the witnesses' statements as outright "lies," yet he cannot accept them as "the truth" either. From his perspective, minor incidents have been given disproportionate importance, while details that might explain the situation have been overlooked. The contrast between "lies" and "the truth" thus conveys his uncertainty about the reliability of the testimony.

In this microcontext, the concept of "crime" is activated not through an explicit designation of the offence, but through the ways in which knowledge about it is constructed in courtroom discourse. The formulation "Not lies exactly, but equally it was not the truth" complicates a simple opposition between truth and

falsehood, suggesting that events have been represented only partially or selectively. Likewise, "unimportant incidents appeared extraordinarily magnified" and "those that would have provided the key to a situation seemed to be ignored" show how an account of the event may emphasize some details while leaving others aside.

The words "appeared" and "seemed" also matter: they mark these judgments as part of John Wilkins's perspective, rather than as established facts. In this context, "crime" is therefore conceptualized not only as an act committed, but also as an object of knowledge reconstructed through perception, memory, the selection of details, and verbal representation.

The following exchange reveals a further cognitive distinction: the difference between a character's judgment of guilt and guilt established through legal proceedings.

> "You seem very sure he's guilty."
> "I certainly am…"
> "That's not to say he'll be found guilty, mind you. Many a murderer walking about scot-free." [6: 236]

In this exchange, "he's guilty" expresses Mr. Morton's own judgment, whereas "he'll be found guilty" refers to a possible legal finding. The distinction is therefore not between two kinds of guilt, but between two statuses of a claim about guilt: personally asserted guilt and legally established guilt. The emphatic "I certainly am" shows Mr. Morton's confidence in his judgment. Yet "That's not to say he'll be found guilty" makes clear that he does not assume the court will reach the same conclusion.

The idiom "scot-free" adds a further evaluative dimension. Meaning "without punishment," it conveys Mr Morton's view that a person he regards as a murderer may escape legal consequences. His use of "murderer" presents guilt as certain from his perspective, even though a guilty verdict remains uncertain.

In this microcontext, the concept of "crime" is conveyed through "guilty," "murderer," and "scot-free," which bring

together the semantic components of culpability, legal judgment, and punishment. The contrast between "he's guilty" and "he'll be found guilty" is particularly significant for the concept's cognitive-discursive structure. The former expresses Mr Morton's firm belief that John Wilkins is guilty; the latter refers to guilt being formally established by the court. The passage thus distinguishes a personal epistemic judgment from an institutional legal judgment.

The idiom "scot-free" in "Many a murderer walking about scot-free" suggests that the expected sequence from crime to a finding of guilt and punishment does not always occur. Crime is consequently conceptualized within a scenario comprising the offence, an assessment of guilt, a legal verdict, and either punishment or impunity. Later, the jury's verdict, "We find the prisoner guilty," shows an individual assessment giving way to an institutional legal finding, illustrating how this conceptual scenario develops over the course of the narrative.

The analysis now turns to linguistic expressions that convey the concept of "betrayal" in the novel:

> That was the first time I met Sheila, and that very first time I told her a lie, saying that May was an invalid and pretending that she was my sister instead of my wife. I don't know now why I did it. [6: 6]

In this microcontext, "betrayal" is activated indirectly through deception, concealment, and the misrepresentation of a relational role, without being explicitly named as "betrayal" or "infidelity." The phrase "I told her a lie" shows that the narrator openly identifies his action as deception. The clause "pretending that she was my sister instead of my wife" reveals how that deception works: May's actual status as his "wife" is replaced in his account to Sheila by that of a "sister." A discrepancy thus emerges between his marital relationship and the version of that relationship he presents to Sheila.

The repetition in "the first time… that very first time" emphasizes that the deception began at the outset of this new relationship. Meanwhile, "I don't know now why I did it"

introduces the narrator's retrospective perspective and uncertainty about his motive. He acknowledges the act but does not present its cause as fully understood. In this passage, "betrayal" is therefore conceptualized through a sequence of deception, concealment, misrepresentation of a relational role, preceding any explicit act of infidelity.

Another passage illustrates how the concept of *betrayal* develops in John's account:

> "If I were not married to May, now, everything would be different. But I was married to May."
> "I put Sheila in May's place, quite unconsciously, and the whole thing was different. I couldn't even imagine anything exciting with May any more, but with Sheila I got to a point where I could imagine nothing else." [6: 92]

John contrasts his marriage to May with his growing desire for Sheila. Here, "betrayal" emerges through a developing cognitive process rather than through an explicit act or a direct lexical designation. The counterfactual clause "If I were not married to May… everything would be different" constructs a mental alternative to his actual marital situation. "But I was married to May" then reasserts the reality that constrains this imagined possibility.

The phrase "I put Sheila in May's place" takes this contrast further: in John's mental representation, Sheila occupies the relational position held by May. The parallel contrast "with May… but with Sheila" shifts the focus of his desire away from May and towards Sheila. The passage therefore presents a cognitive-discursive sequence of marriage, imagining an alternative relationship, mental replacement of the spouse, desire directed towards another person.

The supplied excerpt does not include "I knew it was only imagination." I have therefore left the proposed final stage, in which John explicitly recognizes the experience as imagination, out of the analysis pending that sentence's source context.

The analysis now turns to a microcontext from Tohir Malik's *Shaytanat*:

«Комилов иккита кавказлик йигит билан савдони пишитаётганда ёнида бўлган. Комилов уларни нақд икки юзга тушириб, соат тўртларда Чимкентга қараб жўнаган.

— Чимкентга? Унда Чиноз йўлига қандай бориб қолган?»

"He was present while Komilov was finalizing a deal with two young men from the Caucasus. Komilov brought the price down to exactly two hundred and set off towards Shymkent at around four o'clock.

'Shymkent? Then how did he end up on the road to Chinoz?'" [2: 1, 236]

In this microcontext, the concept of *crime* is activated through an investigative frame and the retrospective reconstruction of events, rather than through a lexical item that directly names a crime. Komilov's reported departure towards Shymkent establishes one part of the event's spatial model. Zohid's question, *«Унда Чиноз йўлига қандай бориб қолган?»* ("Then how did he end up on the road to Chinoz?"), identifies a discrepancy between that reported route and Komilov's subsequent location. It therefore does more than request information: it challenges the coherence of the existing mental model.

On the evidence of the quoted passage, this fragmented model can be represented as departure towards Shymkent → unknown intervening events → Chinoz road. An explanation of the missing stage would remain a hypothesis until supported by further information.

Zohid's question, *«Унда Чиноз йўлига қандай бориб қолган?»* ("Then how did he end up on the road to Chinoz?"), functions as more than a request for information. It identifies a spatial inconsistency in the existing mental model: if Komilov set off towards Shymkent, his subsequent presence on the Chinoz road requires an explanation. The account thus contains a gap between the reported departure and the later location. Hamdam's proposed explanation seeks to fill that gap, but it should be interpreted as a hypothesis, not as an established fact.

The fuller sequence airport → Shymkent → unknown stage → Chinoz road can be used if the surrounding passage confirms

the airport as the starting point. The excerpt supplied so far supports the narrower sequence departure towards Shymkent → unknown stage → Chinoz road.

From this perspective, the microtext presents "crime" as an object of inquiry rather than as an event whose circumstances are already fully known. The participants connect the available information, identify an inconsistency, and mentally reconstruct the missing part of the event through a possible alternative scenario. Zohid's role is primarily to identify the discrepancy, while Hamdam's is to propose a possible explanation. The mental model of the suspected crime is thus constructed gradually over the course of the dialogue.

The following dialogue presents crime as an object of legal and moral evaluation:

> «Жиноят қандай жазога лойиқ? Ўлимгами? Кесилсин, осилсин, чопилсин, тамом! "Беш йилдан ўн йилгача ахлоқ тузатиш колониясига юборилсин" деган гап бўлмаган, дейман, а? Улар тўғри қилишган. Мана, Асадбекни юз йил ахлоқ тузатиш колониясида сақланг, фойда бўлармикин?
>
> — Адашганлар-чи? — деди Зоҳид, унинг гапини бўлиб.
>
> — Адашганларми? — Ҳамдам бир оз ўйланди. — Агар чиндан ҳам адашган бўлса, кечириш керак. Агар адашган одам қамалса, ўндан бири тузалади, бир қисми аламзада бўлади, бир қисми қамоқдаги "жиноят малака ошириш курсида" таълим олиб чиқади. Лекин ким адашди, ким астойдил тавба қилди, билиб бўлмайди-да…»
>
> "What punishment does a crime deserve? Death? Sentence them, hang them, execute them, and that's that! There was no talk of 'sending them to a correctional colony for five to ten years,' I tell you. They had the right idea. Keep Asadbek in a correctional colony for a hundred years—would it do any good?
>
> 'What about those who have gone astray?' Zohid interrupted.
>
> 'Those who have gone astray?' Hamdam thought for a moment. 'If they truly have gone astray, they should be forgiven. If such a person is imprisoned, one in ten will reform, some will become embittered, and others will come out having completed a "professional development course in crime" in prison. But there's no way to know who merely went astray and who has sincerely repented…'" [2; 82]

In this microcontext, the category of "offender" is presented as having internal distinctions. Whereas the preceding example conceptualized crime as an event to be reconstructed from incomplete information, this dialogue treats it as an object of legal and moral evaluation. Hamdam's question, *«Жиноят қандай жазога лойиқ?»* ("What punishment does a crime deserve?"), places "crime" and "punishment" in a normative relationship. Crime is thus categorized not merely as an act that has occurred, but as a violation that calls for a response.

Zohid's interruption introduces a distinction within the category of offenders: some may have *«адашган»* ("gone astray"). Hamdam's answer makes forgiveness conditional on whether this is genuinely the case, while acknowledging that sincere repentance is difficult to establish. The dialogue therefore complicates a uniform judgment of offenders by bringing intention, reform, resentment, and the effects of imprisonment into the evaluation.

Zohid's question, *«Адашганлар-чи?»* ("What about those who have gone astray?"), complicates the preceding distinction between crime and punishment. The word *адашганлар* introduces a differentiation within the category of offenders: alongside the legal category of the "offender," the dialogue constructs an evaluative and cognitive category of the "person who has gone astray." In Hamdam's response, *«Агар чиндан ҳам адашган бўлса, кечириш керак»* ("If they truly have gone astray, they should be forgiven"), the conditional *агар* ("if") is significant. A person is not automatically reclassified as someone who has gone astray; that judgment depends on whether their actions and inner state warrant it.

Hamdam then adds, *«Лекин ким адашди, ким астойдил тавба қилди, билиб бўлмайди-да»* ("But there is no way to know who went astray and who has sincerely repented"). This statement separates a person's legal status from their inner moral state. Evidence may establish that an offence was committed, whereas sincere repentance cannot be observed directly. The microtext thus presents a tension between legal categorization and knowledge of an offender's moral condition.

The expression *«жиноят малака ошириш курсида»* (“in a ‘professional development course in crime’”) also merits attention. It is a contextual ironic metaphor, rather than a fixed idiom. Ordinarily, *малака ошириш курси* (“professional development course”) evokes an institution that improves useful knowledge and skills. By combining it with *жиноят* (“crime”), Malik redirects that positive frame towards the acquisition of criminal skills. The resulting irony exposes a paradox: prison is intended as a place of correction, yet it may also become a place where criminal experience is strengthened.

The next microcontext presents two competing ways of understanding crime:

> «Кўп жиноятларнинг илдизини айнан болаликдан излаш керак. Ҳаётдан зада бўлган боланинг жиноятга кириши осон. Лекин терговда ҳам, ҳукм чиқаришда ҳам бу сабаблар, бу руҳий ҳолатлар ҳисобга олинмайди. Ҳукм учун жиноятнинг ўзи муҳим…»
>
> «…Мен учун икки одам бор: жиноятчи ва жабрланувчи. Орада ҳеч қанақа ҳаёт йўқ…»
>
> “The roots of many crimes should be sought in childhood. A child embittered by life can easily turn to crime. Yet neither the investigation nor the passing of judgment takes these causes and psychological states into account. For the verdict, only the crime itself matters…”
>
> “…For me, there are two people: the offender and the victim. There is no life in between…” [3: 1]

In this microcontext, the dialogue between Zohid and Hamdam sets two models of crime against each other. Zohid’s model connects the offence to a person’s earlier life and psychological experience: childhood and emotional distress become possible causes of criminal behaviour. Hamdam’s model centres on the offence and the two legal roles it creates, the offender and the victim. His statement *«Орада ҳеч қанақа ҳаёт йўқ»* (“There is no life in between”) excludes the offender’s life history from this account.

The contrast can be expressed as personal history, psychological experience, possible causes, crime in Zohid’s

perspective, and crime, offender and victim in Hamdam's. The passage thus shows how the same concept is structured differently according to the speaker's perspective and evaluative priorities.

The first model is gradual and causal: it traces a possible path from childhood experiences and psychological distress to criminal behaviour. The second is based on a binary categorization of "offender" and "victim." Hamdam's statement *«Орада ҳеч қанақа ҳаёт йўқ»* ("There is no life in between") is particularly significant because it excludes the offender's biographical, psychological, and social history from his account of the crime. Thus, the same concept of "crime" acquires different conceptual profiles according to the discourse participant's perspective.

The analysis now turns to a microcontext in which the characters themselves negotiate the meaning of "betrayal":

> «Мен Жамшид акамни яхши кўрардим. Худодан яширмаганни сиздан яширмайман... [...] Мен... Сизга хиёнат қилдим...
>
> Эркак бўлсангиз, мени ўлдирасиз...
>
> — Зайнаб, бу гапни миянгиздан чиқариб ташланг, ишонмайман! — деди Элчин, …»
>
> "I loved Jamshid. I won't hide from you what I haven't hidden from God... [...] I... I betrayed you...
>
> If you are a man, you will kill me...
>
> 'Zaynab, put that thought out of your mind. I don't believe it!' Elchin said…" [3: 89]

This exchange presents a significant cognitive phenomenon: the category of "betrayal" emerges through a character's evaluation of her own conduct. Zaynab explicitly names her act *«хиёнат қилдим»* ("I betrayed you"), thereby placing it within the category of betrayal. Elchin responds with *«ишонмайман»* ("I don't believe it"), refusing to accept her account. The passage thus presents two conflicting positions on the same event: Zaynab's confession and Elchin's rejection of it.

Elchin's words express disbelief, but the excerpt alone does not establish whether he rejects the alleged event itself or

Zaynab's classification of it as betrayal. The distinction matters for the final interpretation of their competing perspectives.

The next microtext extends the concept of *betrayal* beyond personal relationships:

> «…Ҳали у катта тоғанинг, ҳали бунисининг қўнғироғи билан қанча "иш"ни ёпганимни сен билмайсан. Ҳар ёпганимда жабрланувчига хиёнат қилдим. Ҳар ёпганимда юрагимнинг бир томири узилаверди.
>
> — Йўқ, […] Ижрочи — менман. Иймоним ожиз эканки, бўйсунибман….
>
> …Менинг ишларим бошқачароқ бўлди: кучсиз адолат ва адолатсиз куч — икки даҳшат муроса қилди.»
>
> "…You don't know how many 'cases' I closed because one powerful man or another called. Each time I closed one, I betrayed the victim. Each time, it felt as though a vein in my heart had broken.
>
> 'No, […] I was the one who carried it out. My conscience was too weak, and I obeyed…'
>
> …'My cases were different: powerless justice and unjust power—two terrible forces—reached a compromise.'" [3: 215]

In this passage, *betrayal* is explicitly named in *«жабрланувчига хиёнат қилдим»* ("I betrayed the victim"). The speaker evaluates his own compliance with pressure to close cases as a violation of his duty to the victim. The metaphor *«юрагимнинг бир томири узилаверди»* ("a vein in my heart had broken") adds an emotional and moral dimension to that judgment. His admission *«Ижрочи — менман»* ("I was the one who carried it out") also assigns responsibility to himself, despite the pressure exerted by others.

Across the examples discussed, "betrayal" can be examined in different relational domains: Zaynab's perceived breach of loyalty to her spouse, the breach of trust between criminal associates in Hosil's case, and the breach of professional and moral duty to victims and justice in this passage. A violation of trust or duty may serve as a shared conceptual component, with each domain forming a related expression of the concept. This offers a basis for a provisional radial model, although Hosil's

case should be supported by its own quoted microcontext in the article.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

A comparison of the selected microcontexts reveals different ways in which characters describe and evaluate betrayal. In J. Symons's *The Colour of Murder*, John uses expressions such as "lie," "a bit of a lie," "hadn't mentioned," "done for Sheila," and "expected forgiveness" to qualify or soften his account of his conduct. Through these linguistic choices, he reinterprets the act in ways that may reduce his perceived responsibility.

In the selected passages from T. Malik's *Shaytanat*, betrayal is more explicitly framed as a moral judgment. *«Сизга хиёнат қилдим»* ("I betrayed you") expresses self-accusation; *«хоинлигингни билсам ҳам»* ("although I knew of your betrayal") categorizes another person's conduct as betrayal; and *«жабрланувчига хиёнат қилдим»* ("I betrayed the victim") presents a failure of professional duty as a moral wrong for which the speaker accepts responsibility. In these microcontexts, the contrast lies in the characters' discursive responses: John tends to qualify and reframe his conduct, whereas Malik's characters name betrayal and evaluate it in terms of loyalty, responsibility, and duty.

CONCLUSION

The cognitive-discursive analysis shows that, in the selected passages from J. Symons's *The Colour of Murder* and T. Malik's *Shaytanat*, the meanings of "crime" and "betrayal" are shaped not only by the words that name them, but also by the characters' perspectives, degrees of certainty, acts of categorization, and moral evaluations. "Crime" is represented through the retrospective reconstruction of events, the assessment of evidence, the determination of guilt, and legal, causal, and moral judgments about offenders. "Betrayal" emerges as a relational and evaluative concept: it involves a breach of trust, loyalty, an entrusted responsibility, or duty.

In the analyzed passages from Symons, betrayal is often presented through John's attempts to minimize, rename, or justify his conduct. In Malik's passages, characters more explicitly categorize an act or its consequences as betrayal, acknowledge their responsibility, and assess it in moral terms. Perspective, categorization, and evaluative reframing thus emerge as central mechanisms through which both concepts are constructed in these literary texts.

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