

Pragmalinguistic Analysis of Legal Speech Acts in English and Uzbek

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, world linguistics has paid serious attention to the study of language units in the content aspect and the formation of meaning & content. The study of language in connection with the human factor and relationships and the speech situation led to the emergence of a communicative-pragmatic analysis and the development of a pragmalinguistic approach in linguistics. The theory of speech acts related to the speech situation, pragmatic intention, and the psychological state of the speaker is one of the central issues of pragmalinguistic analysis.

The study analyzes speech acts, reflecting various additional propositions, in English and Uzbek legal discourse at the locutionary, propositional, illocutionary, and perlocutionary stages apart from the meaning expressed in the sentence. In legal discourse, locution is an act of pronunciation that conveys certain information, a propositional act is a speech act that expresses the proposition, illocution is an act based on a specific communicative intention and illocutionary force, and finally, perlocution is a result or speech effect of that act. Importantly, the correct understanding of the illocutionary force expressed in illocutionary acts depends on the means and felicity conditions indicating illocutionary force. Since legal discourse is based on formal communication, in some cases illocutionary acts have to be used indirectly, taking into account such pragmatic factors as age, gender, social status, role relations, and cultural & educational level. The tactics of persuasion or

confusion, distraction, and coercion are reflected in English and Uzbek discourse as a perlocutionary effect.

Keywords: Pragmalinguistics, speech acts, legal speech acts, pragmatic intention, illocutionary force, IFIDs, felicity conditions, communicative process

1. INTRODUCTION

By the 60s and 70s of the XX century, the study of many issues within the framework of pragmatic research, such as the communicative purpose and the psychological and mental state of the speaker and listener in the speech process and the evaluation of any linguistic expression as an action, led to the popularization of the theory of speech acts as a separate doctrine. A speech act is a lingua-philosophical concept, which means not only certain information communicated by people but also an action performed. It is known that in the process of communication, the interaction between the addresser and the addressee is aimed at a specific goal or intention, that is, speech participants, along with the initial meaning of language units, tend to use orders, warnings, requests, promises and other forms of performative and non-performative expression. This requires correctly applying communicative rules and principles in speech and thereby influencing the listener. Accordingly, the study of communication patterns is considered an important aspect of the theory of speech acts.

The views on the speech act belong to scientists such as V. Humboldt, E. Benveniste, S. Karsevsky, L. Yakubinsky, K. Buhler, Sh. Bally, and M. Bakhtin (Linguistic Encyclopedic Dictionary). However, the main essence of speech act theory is associated with the names of English logician J. Austin & American philosopher J. Searle. J. Austin's lectures on speech acts, performative verbs, and the types of speech acts were summarized in a work entitled *How to Do Things with Words* and published by his followers after his death. In this work, the scientist divided sentences or utterances in speech into two groups – constative and performative, noting that “performatives

are such sentences in which we perform a certain action- it is not typically considered to be just saying something” (Austin 1962: 4-11). For example, to say “I promise” is an action performed using the right words, and such utterances have no truth value and do not describe the action as constative sentences; it is the action itself. He opines that the category of performatives includes marrying, christening, apologizing, vowing, etc., whilst constatives can only be correct or incorrect propositions describing an event” (Austin 1962: 9-10). Austin ultimately rejected this classification and concluded that all forms of communication are actions. The scientist’s theory also notes that speech acts are carried out with the help of such conditions as the pronunciation of articulatory sounds representing common language codes, the formation of expressions from words of a certain language in accordance with its grammatical rules, and the provision of this expression with content and reference (Khakimov 2001: 110). Although it is considered one of the main theories of speech acts, J. Searle lists six of its main drawbacks: 1) there is constant confusion between verbs and actions; 2) all of the listed verbs are not illocutionary verbs; 3) there is a lot of overlap and 4) heterogeneity between categories; 5) most of the verbs listed in the categories do not fit this definition and 6) most importantly, there is no single principle of classification (Searle 1979: 11-12). With such critical thoughts, the scientist defined speech acts in his concept as follows: “The creation and use of speech signs under certain conditions are speech acts that are the most important and minimal unit of the communicative process” (Searle 1969: 16).

The concept of a speech act is also defined by other linguists. For instance, the famous English linguist G. Yule stated that people, expressing their thoughts, not only form sentences containing grammatical structures and words, but also with the help of these sentences perform an action pursuing a certain communicative goal, and sentences expressed by such an action are speech acts (Yule 1996: 47). S. Levinson, on the other hand, noted that speech acts are the main condition for understanding language as a whole and add propositions, such as an assertive, promise or command, to a context that concentrates the general

cognitive background of the participants of the discourse (Levinson 1980: 18).

Uzbek scientists also reacted differently to this issue. In particular, Sh. Safarov, studying the problem of speech act, puts forward the view that the pronunciation of a certain sentence in a specific communicative process is a speech act (Safarov 2008: 78). In addition, the linguist's book entitled *Pragmalinguistics* highlights various views on the speech act and its types, the role of the speech act in pragmalinguistics, the stages of the speech act and, most importantly, indirect speech acts and their expression (pp. 71-107).

M. Khakimov's doctoral dissertation is of great importance in the study of the theory and types of speech acts in Uzbek texts. The reason is that the scientist investigated the classification of types of speech act in world linguistics and explained his classification based on the text. The scientist defined the speech act as a contractual meaning that should be understood by reference and propositional acts between the speaker and the listener, expressing information about the subject of speech" (Khakimov 2001: 107).

From the above definitions, it is known that a speech act as the minimal unit of a communicative process is an action based on a specific communicative goal of the speaker and the listener, speech expressed by the speaker in a certain environment, or a linguistic appeal aimed at the listener and the content of the text or speech. At the same time, speech acts are performed under the principles and rules of speech behavior adopted in a particular society. As a result of their consistent application, a certain discourse is created.

Apart from linguistic factors, extralinguistic factors are no less important in the realization of the content of a speech act, since the result of any sentence with an action is clarified mainly in the context or in the speech process. Accordingly, most pragmalinguists evaluate a speech act as a three-stage activity, that is, as J. Austin recognized, to perform a speech act, first of all, there must be three types of acts. These are locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts (Austin 1962: 98-102).

In the sources, a locutionary act is defined as a certain noise, in the form of an expression consisting of certain words or referents in certain construction, an illocutionary act is an act expressing an attitude aimed at a certain goal and having a certain function or “power” performed simultaneously with a locutionary act, and, finally, a perlocutionary act is a result or a consequence of an illocutionary act (Cruse 2000: 331-332). It is evident that the locutionary act has a certain meaning, the illocutionary act has power, and the perlocutionary act has an effect. However, unlike J. Austin’s classification, J. Searle noted that the locutionary act, propositional act, and illocutionary act are necessary elements in the emergence of a speech act (Searle 1986: 151-169).

2. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The lack of special studies of legal speech acts in the Uzbek language shows the relevance of this problem. Therefore, in the work we analyzed the stages of legal speech acts in English and Uzbek as follows:

2.1. *Representation of a locutionary act in legal discourse*

Locution, which is still the object of study of many semantic theories in linguistics, is interpreted as an act of speaking from a pragmalinguistic point of view. A locutionary act (English locution – “speech”) is a stage of linguistic expression, that is, the direct pronunciation of a sentence with a certain meaning using linguistic means. According to Sh. Safarov’s definition, “We create a meaning expression in the process of communication and through its pronunciation we carry out speech activity, the executor of this activity is locution or a locutionary act” (Safarov 2008: 81-82), but the scientist emphasizes that for a locutionary act to occur, a sentence must be spoken, and a written sentence does not represent a locution. M. Khakimov points out that the level of the speaker’s perception of reality in the objective world and its verbal and non-verbal expression is a locutionary act (Khakimov 2001: 119). However, M. Kurbanova is somewhat critical of this idea and believes that

there is no connection between the non-verbal expression of reality and the locutionary act (Kurbanova 2018: 160). In our opinion, the verbal expression of communication is sufficient for a locutionary act to occur. The reason is that this act, as a complex structure, includes the pronunciation of sounds (the act of phonation), the expression of words and their combination based on certain grammatical rules, the designation of specific objects with their help (the act of reference), as well as the introduction of a specific feature or attitude to these objects (the act of predication). Nonverbal expression of communication is of great importance in the emergence of illocutionary as well as perlocutionary acts based mainly on a specific intention. Accordingly, it can be said that within the framework of a locutionary act, only a sentence composed according to certain grammatical rules is correctly pronounced, but no purpose is pursued in transmitting information to the listener. For example:

1. **Mr. Henriques:** *Five days later on 3rd May 1997, Mrs. Pomfret had an appointment at 9.30 am*
(Shipman Trial)
2. **Defense attorney:** *Sudlanuvchi Snyatovskaya Oksana Vladimirovna tergov va sud davrida unga nisbatan qo'yilayotgan ayblovga qisman iqror ekanligini va unga nisbatan JKning 167-moddasi bilan noxaq ayblov qo'yilganligini aytib ko'rgazma berdi.*
(S.O. Vladimirovna Trail)

In these sentences, phonetic, lexical, and syntactic units are adequately pronounced on the side of the speaker, resulting in the formation of locutionary acts with a specific meaning and reference.

According to J. Austin's theory, locutionary act is divided into phonetic, phatic, and rhetic action. In particular, the pronunciation of certain sounds generates a phonetic act. M. Khakimov noted that the discrepancy in the pronunciation of sounds creates a pragmatic barrier, the listener experiences difficulties with the correct understanding of the proposition in the speech act, and that such a barrier is sometimes associated with the individual or mental state of the speaker of the speech

(Khakimov 2001: 121). He also opined that in this case, the listener's attention is focused not on the main content of the statement, but on the information that appears when the speaker pronounces a speech act, and this is a pragmatic obstacle (Khakimov 2013: 125). Violation of phonetic norms can sometimes be observed in legal discourse. Such a situation rarely occurs in the speech of legal professionals such as a court, lawyer, or prosecutor, since the dominance of the rules of formal style in this discourse does not allow this. Therefore, a pragmatic obstacle caused by phonetic factors may occur mainly in the speech of witnesses or accused. Let's analyze the following examples:

1. **Safo Ismoil (witness):** *Keyin ikkinchi marta o'tirdik. Bular Akmal bilan o'tirdi. 200 \$ dan zakalad berdik*
(F. Xushvaqtoev Trial)
2. **A. Tursunboyev (defendant):** *"Muhtaram sudya, o'rtoq prokuror! Men fuqarolarni aldamaganman. Odamlar o'z xohishlari bilan pullarni olib kelgan." Mening maqsadim mana shu 20 ming bosh qoramolga ferma, 1 mlrd tovuqqa joy qilayotganiydim. 2 ming gektarga baliqchilikka ko'l barpo qilayotganiydim*
(Ahmadjon Tursunboyev Trial,
<https://kun.uz/uz/63191742?q=%2F63191742>).

Indeed, words borrowed from other languages are actively used in the Uzbek language, and such words undergo various changes due to phonetic phenomena. One of these phenomena is epenthesis, that is, the acquisition of sound between words, which we can see in the first sentence by the example of the word *zakalad* in the speech of a witness. *Zakalad*, which is actually a *zaklad*, contains the vowel "a" acquired in this example. L. Kiseleva, speaking about the pragmatic barrier, divides the language barrier into two types and includes too fast and unusual pronunciation among the obstacles associated with the formation of expression (Kiseleva 1978: 136). In this second sentence, the defendant's speech is also delivered quickly, making it difficult for listeners to understand the speech. In addition, the lexeme *qilayotganiydim* with the phenomenon of sandhi (condensation of

analytical forms) also led to a communicative and pragmatic difficulty. Or:

Prosecutor: *About how long into your friendship or relationship did that start occurring?*

Witness: *mm-hmm, (unclear – six words) like from the beginning.*

Judge: *Play into the microphone! We're having trouble hearing.*

Prosecutor: *He said "pretty much out the gate"*

(Ashley McArthur Trial)

In this example, rapid and unusual pronunciation caused incomprehensibility of the expression, discomfort, and a pragmatic barrier between the participants in the discourse.

The inappropriate behavior of the speaker or the normative inconsistency of the sentence is an obstacle to the intended illocutionary content. This is why the appropriate and normative use of a phonetic act is important in the process of creating a locutionary act.

According to the theories of J. Austin, a phatic act is an expression of sound combinations or words based on certain grammatical and lexical rules, which in any case are considered a subgroup of the phonetic act. He also stated that "He said 'Cat on the Mat' is a phatic act" (Austin 1962: 95-96).

Mr. Dingemans: *...it says this: "... he devised the scientific basis for the enhanced biological warfare defence programme and led strong research groups in many key areas."*

(Hutton Inquiry)

Defense attorney: *Mirsoliyev, pora olmoqchi bo'lsangiz nima uchun qochdingiz? - degan savolga u: "Agar qochmasam mashinamga shu pulni tashlab bo'lsa ham qo'lga tushirmoqchi edilar", -degan vajni bildirdi*

("Defense speeches of attorneys of Uzbekistan" 2006: 131).

Direct sentences in these examples can be the basis for a phatic act in legal discourse since lexemes and punctuation are used in pronunciation correctly and according to strict grammatical rules. However, these sentences open the way to a rhetic act in the form of an indirect sentence. The reason is that the rhetic act is

provided with clear content and reference, and the attitude of the speaker towards the sentence begins to be felt. We can see this in the following examples:

Rod Gaston: *And he also said that Physician Assistant Longley breached the standard of care*

(Brain aneurism misdiagnosis case)

Defense attorney: *Mamatovaning uyiga uning ruxsati bilan kirishganligini, ularning kirishlariga Mamatova qarshilik qilmaganligini, u yerda hech narsani titkilamaganligini, biron narsani olish niyati bo'lmaganligini bayon qildi.*

(Defense speeches of attorneys of Uzbekistan 2006: 35).

Thus, the phonetic act underlying the locutionary act arises in the standard pronunciation of sounds, the phatic act in the correct lexico-grammatical use of the sentence, and the rhetic act in enriching this sentence with content and reference.

2.2. Representation of a propositional act in legal discourse

The doctrine of J. Searle emphasizes the concept of the proposition, which leads to a propositional act, in which an act asserts or states the object of speech (<https://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/>). A speech act of this type expresses a clear and specific meaningful statement in relation to a speech act that sometimes has an incorrect pronunciation, but in any case, for a propositional act to occur, there must first be a locutionary act.

1. **Laura Zois:** *Gregory had a headache in December. Not since December. And for every one of these doctors, they're responsible for knowing what's been going on with this child for these many days.*

(A brain aneurism misdiagnosis case)

2. **D.D. Bedilova:** *Bundan tashqari M.A. Saliyeva pensiyaga chiqqunga qadar maktabda o'qituvchi lavozimida ishlab kelgan va barcha oylik ish xaqi va pensiyalarini yig'ib kelgan.*

(X.U. Ibragimova Trail)

In Example 1, “Gregory has a headache,” and in Sentence 2, “M. Saliyeva worked as a school teacher and received a salary and pension” can be seen as a propositional act. Although the propositional act expresses a certain true or false proposition about the subject of speech, the implementation of such an act through pronunciation is closely related to the locutionary act, and the intended purpose of the proposition is closely related to the illocutionary act. In addition, speakers, not sentences, can trigger such an act.

2.3. Representation of the illocutionary act in legal discourse

When one utters a sentence, a certain goal is pursued in it, and the realization of this goal leads to the commission of an illocutionary act. The term illocution is the central concept of the speech act theory, in which the speaker tries to directly or indirectly convey to his interlocutor a proposition, command, warning, suggestion, request, and other communicative goals during the utterance of a certain sentence. The illocutionary act is defined as a pragmatic component of the meaning of a sentence, reflecting the speaker’s goal. Sh. Safarov, evaluating the view of the Ukrainian linguist O. Pochepsov on illocution, states that illocution is an expression of interpersonal relationships that never occurs without communicative activity (Safarov 2008: 83). In our opinion, the illocutionary act is performed by itself and is inextricably linked with speech activity, since any sentence is expressed based on a clear goal. Accordingly, although some expressions in Uzbek are not propositional acts, they can be purposeful illocutionary acts in the communicative process. For example, the words *Voy*, *tovba*, *Xudo saqlasin*, *Qarangga* can express surprise, warning, rejection, and other different communicative purposes or content in the context of the addressee.

The main parameter of the illocutionary act is the content or purpose of a particular sentence. Z. Vendler considers the illocutionary goal as a mental action or mental state that the speaker expects from the listener (Vendler 1985: 243). In other words, under the illocutionary goal we can understand the specific type of speech impact that the speaker wants to achieve,

and this goal is realized based on the illocutionary force in the context. It should be noted that illocutionary purpose underlies illocutionary force. According to Strawson, the illocutionary force is the force to be understood in terms of the speaker's purpose in the sentence (Strawson 1986: 149).

1. **The Clerk:** *And I ask you please lean forward into the mic and keep your voice up for the record. Can you state your name and spell your last name for me please?*

(A brain aneurism misdiagnosis case)

2. **Defense attorney Ahrorov:** *Ijozat bersangiz Yo'ldosheva bilan yuzlashtirib olsam? Nima sababdan siz tomonidan bu imzolanmaganligini tushuntirib bera olasizmi?*

(G. Yo'ldosheva Trial)

The speaker was not going to just ask these questions in these sentences. On the contrary, they have the force of a request and a command, and the addressee encourages the addressee to perform this action according to the rules of speech etiquette. So, illocutionary force is a tactic of expressing one's opinion by the speaker, that is, a way or opportunity to verbally influence the listener to achieve the intended goal in communication. In the examples given, the speaker used the method of indirect expression of a directive speech act based on the context due to some pragmatic factors. Legal discourse is based on formal communication, in which such factors as age, gender, social status, role relations, and cultural and educational level are important. Sh. Safarov notes that the discrepancy between what the speaker wants to convey and what he says is especially evident when using ironic phrases since in ironies the speaker never refers directly to the speech act. Similar speech acts can also be observed in legal discourse (Safarov 2008: 104-105).

Judge: *Address to 'liq?*

Witness: *Buxoroda*

Judge: *Buxoro katta viloyatda endi ukam.*

Witness: *Buxoro viloyati, Sargush qishlog'i, Paxtakor 100-uy*

(F. Xushvaqtov Trial)

In this speech, the judge expressed an order, not a proposition that Bukhara is a large region. To properly understand the irony of the *Addressni to'liq ayting* presupposition, the recipient must rely on general knowledge and language skills. It is known that even in legal discourse, sometimes the speaker tacitly expresses a communicative intention when presenting information and tries to increase the force of speech impact.

It is characteristic that a particular sentence may have different illocutionary force. If we analyze the speech "*Clerk: All rise/Turing, sud kelyapti*" as

- | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. I order that all rise | Men buyruq beraman turing |
| 2. I request that all rise | Men iltimos qilaman turing |
| 3. I ask that all rise | Men so'rayman turing |

we can notice (1) an order, (2) a request, and (3) asking as illocutionary force (in judicial discourse this structure has an order illocutionary force). The listener's correct understanding of the illocutionary force intended by the speaker depends on the IFIDs – *Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices* and *felicity conditions*. The English linguist G. Yule believes that performative verbs are a means of determining the underlying illocutionary force, but sometimes they are not used vividly in a sentence, and in such cases one can determine the illocutionary force through word order, stress, and intonation (Yule 1996: 49-50). For the desired speech act to be effective and achieve a certain goal, certain conditions must be met, which, according to the theory of speech acts, are known as Felicity conditions, that is, the structure of speech must be pragmatically successful (pragmatically felicitous), without becoming grammatically correct. J. Austin also interpreted the need to comply with certain conditions regarding speech action when using speech acts as follows: "If the speaker wants to fulfill the act of promise, he must first fulfill the condition under which the listener or the promise must require the promised action, and this act is effective only if he has there is a desire to fulfill this need" (Austin 1962: 39-41). The felicity conditions are that the sentence expressed follows conditions such as appropriate

context, conventionality, dominance, and sincerity of the addressee. Although these terms were first introduced into linguistics by J. Austin, J. Searle proposed special rules for each illocutionary act, and they are (Searle 1969: 66-67):

- **Propositional content** is a constraint on the propositional content of an expression. For example, in the act of promising, the propositional content must reflect a future action, or in the act of apologizing, the speaker must apologize for the action for which he is responsible.
- **Preparatory condition** is the authority of the speaker, the state of the speech act, that is, all objective and subjective conditions are suitable for its successful implementation. It also requires the addresser to dominate the addressee.
- **Sincerity condition** – when performing a certain speech act, of course, the speaker must have a certain psychological attitude to the propositional content of the sentence. For example, if he wants to fulfill an act of promise, he must have the intention to commit X (at any time) or have a strong desire for X in an order act. Otherwise, there is a state of expression (lying or creating a false impression) of a mental state that does not exist in communication. In general, the seriousness and correctness of the speech act used depends on the sincerity condition.
- **Essential condition** – the successful implementation of a speech act is related to the content of the sentence, context, and intention of the actor, and in this the speaker strives and encourages the listener to commit the intended action. M.: while the act of “request” is an attempt by the addressee to perform the action, the act of “promise” imposes on the addressee the obligation to perform this action.

In legal discourse, we can interpret these conditions with the help of the following declarative speech:

Judge Badriddinov: O'zbekiston Respublikasi Jinoyat-prosessual kodeksining 454-457, 462-463, 465-468, 471-473-moddalariga amal qilib, sud hukm qildi: Zoirov Boxodirjon Mamurovich

O'zbekiston Respublikasi Jinoyat kodeksining 270-moddasi 1-qismi bilan aybli deb topilsin

(B. Zoirov Trial)

This act is considered pragmatically felicitous since it follows all the specified rules. The reason is that only a judge has the legal authority to make a verdict that everyone takes seriously and correctly. In addition, speech is performed in judicial discourse, and the speaker encourages the addressee to perform an action.

A marriage officiant: By the powers vested in me by the state of Illinois, I pronounce you husband and wife

(Lillian & Doug's marriage from "Bridesmaids")

Although the speech fragment in this film episode is a declarative act, it is pragmatically infelicitous since felicity conditions are not met, because the addresser playing a role led to a violation of propositional content. Also, the speaker does not have the right to solemnize the marriage and this means that the speech is not serious and sincere indicating that the conditions of preparation and sincerity are not met as well. Finally, the addressee also does not hope that the listeners will perform this action as the speech is not serious and it indicates the violation of essential condition. If this very act is performed legally on the example of legal discourse, it meets the felicity conditions.

Thus, the illocutionary force determining the illocutionary act depends entirely on IFIDs and felicity conditions, and compliance with these conditions ensures that the expressed sentence is felicitous.

The Archbishop: I pronounce that they be man and wife together, In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.

(Prince William & Miss Catherine Middleton' marriage)

2.4. Representation of a perlocutionary act in legal discourse

Any expressed locution generates an illocutionary act with a specific intention and its result, that is, the effect on the thoughts,

actions, and feelings of the addressee, is the phenomenon of perlocution. J. Austin noted that the pronunciation of a certain expression is considered a locutionary act, its enrichment with content and reference is an illocutionary act, and the achievement of a certain result through this expression is a perlocutionary act. For instance, by employing commands, warnings, requests, and other illocutionary acts, the speaker can influence the listener, which then may result in persuasion, prevention, threat, surprise, distraction, and coercion. Accordingly, the sentence “I warn” is an illocutionary act, whereas “I warned” is a perlocution (Austin 1962: 108-109). However, it is not always possible to predict the speech effect or the result in the communicative process. The reason is that the expressed illocutionary act may affect the listener in different ways, and, as a result, the perlocution may vary. Sh. Safarov, generalizing the views of many pragmatologists, argues that a perlocutionary act, unlike an illocution, is not a linguistic event, because a perlocutionary result is possible without any speech act. The analysis of the perlocutionary result is not part of the tasks of pragmatics, because the power of the pragmatic influence is connected with the goal, and not with the result. Nevertheless, he prefers to analyze the perlocutionary act within the framework of pragmatic linguistics (Safarov 2008: 85). In our opinion, the scientist is right in this regard, because the main goal of any speech activity is to influence the addressee and achieve a certain result. Action without results is unsuccessful.

In legal discourse, the result and the impact of speech are extremely important, because it determines in which direction the case will go and how it will be resolved. In particular, in the judicial discourse, the lawyers of the parties and prosecutors make every effort to cause a perlocutionary effect. On the other hand, when using various tactics, there are also cases of strong influence on the addressee, that is, misleading, distraction or dissuasion. Examples:

Defense Attorney: And you recall being placed under oath and on us asking you questions about this paper, this case before the state I'm referring to page 16 of the deposition. So let's start back it.

Starting at page 15 line 25 through line 14 I approach the witness I don't want you to read thing out loud just to yourself, okay. That's the cover page start right here line 25.

Witness: *Ok, well that was not the same night*

Defense Attorney: *Okay and in the deposition did you say it was the same night*

Witness: *Yes (Ashley MacArthur's Trail)*

In this very communicative process, the lawyer asks the witness various questions and evidence to clarify the truth. The tactic of interrogation and warning (under oath) is also used to verify the authenticity of these testimonies. This causes the witness to become distracted and change his mind under pressure. As a result, the witness is forced to admit the truth. Or:

Prosecutor: *Miss Cook, do you get nervous when you're under pressure?*

Witness: *Yes*

Prosecutor: *Are you nervous today?*

Witness: *Yes*

Prosecutor: *Were you nervous in your deposition?*

Witness: *Yes*

Prosecutor: *Did you misspeak about when you saw the cocaine in your deposition? (Ashley MacArthur's Trail)*

Witness: *Yes*

In legal discourse, the addressee is mainly trying to have a strong emotional impact on the addressee and establish a psychological connection. As a result, the listener is forced to perform some action. This could be witnessed in the following speech:

Defendant: *Sizlar mening advokatimni gapirtirasizlarmi yoki yo'qmi? (in a threatening tone)*

Claimant: *E'tiroz bo'lgan-ku! O'zingizni bosib oling! Hurmatli sudya, iltimos tartibga chaqiring! ...e'tiroz bildirishi mumkin.*

Judge: *Sud sizlarni ogohlantiradi, o'tiringlar! Kotiba sud bayonnomasiga kiritib qo'ying da'vogar hamda javobgarga ogohlantirish. Buzmanglar! Imkoniyat beringlar, javob berib olsinlar! (Everyone maintains order)*

(K. Dusov Trail)

This speech presents a two-way speech effect, namely: the influence of the claimant on the judge through the act of request and the influence of the judge on those in the courtroom through the act of order and warning. Meanwhile, the warning of the judge leads to the cessation of disputes and silence in the courtroom. M. Khakimov stated that the perlocutionary function of a warning is to alert a person, and the practical result of an act of speech influence is to create anxiety (Khakimov 2001: 129).

CONCLUSION

In the 60s and 70s of the last century, the development of pragmalinguistics in linguistics paved the way for the study of the theory of speech acts, which is one of the important linguistic phenomena. According to general definitions, a speech act is a communication between the addresser and the addressee with a specific communicative goal (command, warning, request, promise, etc), and the principles and rules of speech behavior accepted in society it is also the smallest unit of speech communication, which is performed using various tactics and having a certain effect.

1. Speech acts are studied mainly in three stages, including locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. There is no purpose in performing a locutionary act consisting of a specific sound, pronunciation and meaning, and this act consists of phonetic, phatic, and rhetic acts. Sometimes breaking the pronunciation norm when creating a phonetic act in legal discourse leads to a pragmatic barrier that makes it difficult for the listener to understand the speech. This situation is observed in both English and Uzbek discourse mainly in the speech of the witness and the defendant. In both discourses, direct sentences, used according to grammatical norms, are examples of a phatic act, while indirect sentences are examples of a rhetic act. In Searle's doctrine, the propositional act also occupies a special place, and such acts, representing a proposition are common in English and Uzbek legal discourse.

2. One of the most important aspects of the theory of speech acts is illocutionary acts that have a specific communicative purpose and implicitly or explicitly represent an additional proposition. Any illocutionary intention is realized based on illocutionary force, indicating the method or possibility of speech influence on the addressee. The correct understanding of this illocutionary force depends on IFIDs - Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices and the conditions of felicity formed by J. Searle. Failure to comply with these principles in legal discourse leads to discourse infelicity.
3. The perlocution resulting from the performance of an illocutionary act is of significance in legal discourse. Therefore, to achieve a strong speech effect or result, lawyers and prosecutors use various tactics in the process of communication to create situations such as confusion, distraction, persuasion, and coercion.

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